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RÉSumÉ / AbstRAct
Cet article analyse la réforme des systèmes de protection sociale dans deux pays 
méditerranéens, prenant comme point de départ le modèle des variétés du capitalisme. 
Son but est de démontrer l’intérêt d’une méthode  intégrant les différentes approches à 
l’étude de l’État providence. Prenant comme point de départ la capacité limitée des théories 
existantes pour expliquer la dynamique de réforme des économies de l’Europe du Sud, 
l’article déploie une analyse sur deux niveaux pour rendre compte de la dynamique et de la 
direction du changement en Espagne et en Italie. L’intégration des conclusions provenant 
du modèle des variétés de capitalisme et de la littérature scientifique sur l’évolution de 
l’État providence nous aident à mieux comprendre les mécanismes du changement dans 
les économies hybride de l’Europe du sud. À cette fin, nous analysons l’interaction entre 
régime de production et de protection sociale. Parmi les variables clefs de cette analyse 
se trouvent : la fragmentation organisationnelle des associations collectives, les types de 
coalition de réforme, ainsi que les caractéristiques des systèmes politiques.
This paper reviews the reform of social protection systems in two Mediterranean economies 
in the light of the Varieties of Capitalism theory. Far from providing an exhaustive and detailed 
explanation of change in all areas of social protection, the paper aims to show the need to integrate 
insights from different approaches to welfare reform. The starting point is the limited capacity 
of existing approaches when it comes to explaining reform dynamics in southern European 
economies. The paper uses a two-level analytical framework in order to understand the dynamics 
and direction of change in Italy and Spain. The integration of insights from the varieties of 
capitalism and the politics of welfare reform literature helps to achieve a better understanding 
of mechanisms underlying change in the Southern European hybrid political economies. The 
interactions between production regimes and protection systems are analysed extensively. The 
organizational fragmentation of collective associations, the type of reform coalitions as well as 
the characteristics of the political system stand as important variables to explain change in social 
protection models of these countries.
______________________
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Espagne, Italie, réformes, politique sociale, variétés du capitalisme 
Italy, reform, Spain, social policy, varieties of Capitalism
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introduction
Changes observed in the institutions governing the wage-labour 
nexus and social protection systems of Italy and Spain have attracted the 
close attention of scholars for more than a decade (Adam and Canziani, 
1997; Perez, 2000; Cebrian et al., 2001; Molina, 2005; Molina and 
Rhodes, 2007). These analyses have tried to answer a series of puzzling 
developments: the achievement of macroeconomic stability allowing 
EMU entry despite apparently intractable initial imbalances; the 
consolidation and re-organization of collective bargaining systems that 
have resisted pressures for decentralisation notwithstanding a gradual 
loss of trade union strength; the resurgence of tripartite concertation and 
social pacts between employers, unions and governments (Rhodes, 2001; 
Hancké and Rhodes, 2005; Regini, 2003; Royo, 2002; Molina, 2006); and 
the renegotiation of welfare states and social protection systems without 
delivering across-the-board retrenchment and substantial cuts in benefit 
entitlements. 
Even though the two countries have been subject to similar exogenous 
pressures, a closer inspection of their protection systems reveals the 
existence of some differences in the form and extent of institutional 
reaction. Two approaches in the welfare reform literature try to account 
for these differences. First, the work of Pierson (2001) around the politics 
of retrenchment highlighted the importance of political institutions, veto 
points and trade unions as purposive political actors (Bonoli, 2001). On 
the other hand, Huber and Stephens (1999) placed a stronger emphasis 
upon the interaction between production and protection systems. 
Following a similar approach, the Varieties of Capitalism literature argued 
that companies and employer organizations play a key role in explaining 
welfare state expansion and retrenchment (Hall and Soskice, 2001). 
According to the Varieties of Capitalism argument, business and their 
competitive requirements play a central role as the protection system 
affects not only labour costs, but also workers’ decisions to invest in 
skills. 
This paper approaches the analysis of change in Italy and Spain by 
drawing on insights from the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) literature 
(Soskice, 1999; Hall and Soskice, 2001) but complementing it with 
elements of the politics of retrenchment theories. The starting point of 
the paper are the limitations of the Varieties of capitalism theory: the little 
attention paid to the role of the state, the over simplification of national 
models and ideal-types, an excessive concern for institutional stability 
and deterministic change, and finally, the difficulties to explain cases that 
fit uneasily within the two ideal-types of Coordinated or Liberal Market 
economies (Crouch, 2005; Molina and Rhodes, 2007). The familist 
character of the welfare state, characterized by the pivotal role of the family 
as care giver, a specific configuration of gender relations and a limited 
provision of public care services, suggests distinctive forms of adjustment 
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to exogenous pressures as well as interactions between production systems 
and protection models different from those in the CME (Coordinated 
Market Economies) or LME (Liberal Market Economies) ideal-types 
(Leibfried, 1992; Castles, 1994, Ferrera, 1996; Naldini, 2002).
Italy and Spain fit uneasily into the existing theoretical frameworks. 
For that reason we build on the insights of other recent contributions 
(e.g.: Amable, 2003; Schmidt, 2002) in our search for explanations of 
changes and institutional reforms in Mixed Market Economies (MMEs). 
We propose a two-tiered framework for analysing change in MMEs and 
address theoretical issues concerning institutional change and the role of 
complementarities. The nature of the micro-foundations of MMEs and 
instances of fit and misfit between the protection and production systems 
of these economies are examined. Differences in the organization of 
economic interests and the degree of state intervention in the economy 
determine the mix in micro forms of coordination and regulation, the 
behaviour of actors (for instance, investment in specific assets) and help 
to explain the emergence and characteristics of coalitions. But this micro 
approach has to be complemented with the analysis of the macro political 
structures that determine the success of reform coalitions in transforming 
demands and preferences into policies and institutional innovation. 
Accordingly, the paper brings politics and power relations shaped by 
political institutions (the macro tier) into the explanation of change, thus 
complementing the VoC focus on the micro tier in order to explain policy 
recalibration. 
The paper shows how the organizational capacities of actors and the 
degree and form of state intervention (and retrenchment) contribute to 
explain forms of coordination and interaction and the character of reform 
coalitions. The fragmentation of social partners has been a hindrance 
for the development of new forms of autonomous or associational 
coordination and provision of protection in response to the changing role 
of the state (Trampusch, 2007). The nature and power of coalitions hinge 
on the organizational and political power of interest associations, and 
these depend in turn on the institutional configuration of the respective 
[macro] models of socio-economic governance (Menz, 2003, p. 536). 
The recalibration of links between production systems and protection 
regimes has been carried out through complex processes of exchange 
involving negotiation in several policy arenas in order to weaken the 
resistance of veto actors. Overall, the paper concludes that institutional 
change under the exogenous pressures of EMU in Italy and Spain has not 
been driven so much by positive feedbacks generated from the bottom-
up (as we would expect in CMEs) or the dynamics of market-oriented 
environments for firms (as in LMEs). Instead the experience of MMEs in 
the 1990s has been characterized by the search for new forms of domestic 
coordination before exogenous shocks, conditioned by the existing 
organizational capacities of socio-economic actors, the coalitions they 
create and their respective veto powers.
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The paper is organized in three sections. Section I contains a review 
of the Varieties of Capitalism literature. More specifically, we look at the 
treatment of Southern European economies within the theory. Section 
II analyses the adjustment process protection systems of  Italy and Spain 
in the last two decades. Section III concludes.
Southern Europe and Varieties of 
capitalism
The political economy debate around changes in welfare states has 
begun to address in recetn years the relationship between production 
systems and protection regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1999; Ebbinghaus, 
1998; Hall and Soskice, 2001). Soskice (1990) and Hollingsworth 
and Boyer (1997) drew attention to institutional spillovers within 
economic systems influencing economic and employment performance. 
These spillovers suggest the existence of a series of institutional 
complementarities and positive feedbacks between protection (the 
welfare state and labour market regulation) and production regimes 
(the dominant form of competition among firms, systems of corporate 
governance and forms of specialization in international market 
competition). Two ideal-typical cases, liberal market economies and 
coordinated market economies (LMEs and CMEs), emerge from this 
analysis. In each case, protection and production sub-systems seem to be 
coherent and their institutions tightly coupled.
Each of these two ideal-types is characterized by a different logic 
of interaction and coordination between actors. In LMEs the market 
is a major source of regulation, guides interactions at a micro-level and 
coordinates the activities of socio-economic actors across the spheres 
of production and protection. In countries belonging to this cluster 
(the US, UK, and Ireland) institutions (and formal regulations) create a 
market-friendly environment where actors are negatively «constrained» 
to enter into arms’ length relations with each other. By contrast, actors 
in CMEs use diverse forms of strategic coordination relying on a dense 
network of corporate institutions and associations. Actors are positively 
«constrained» to interact within a well-defined set of formal and informal 
rules and take account of each others’ objectives, strategies and power 
resources.
The pitfalls of this theory become apparent when we face the analysis 
of economies that fall outside the boundaries of the two ideal-types of 
CMEs and LMEs. In the case of Southern Europe, relationships are 
much more complex of what has been suggested for the other two ideal 
types. Thus for instance, production systems tend to be characterized 
by a higher degree of diversity and fragmentation between small and 
large companies, public and private sectors as well as between regions. 
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Moreover, several forms of interaction and coordination between actors 
exist thus making it difficult to identify a single coherent production 
model with a well-defined and strong comparative advantage. On the 
other side, social protection models and welfare states are significantly 
different from the traditional liberal or social-democratic / bismarckian 
models (Leibfried, Naldini, Moreno, Crouch, 2001). Some authors 
defend their inclusion into a third Mediterranean group (Castles, 
1994) characterized by fragmentation in programs, a high degree of 
clientelism, the mix of bismarckian (pensions) and liberal (health) 
features and last but not least, the critical role of the family providing 
protection and care. 
It is accordingly necessary to innovate along two lines the theory of 
VoC in order to be able to extend some of its arguments to the mixed 
models of Southern Europe. First, it is indispensable to shed further 
light into the complex relationship between production systems and 
protection models and the implications regarding complementarities. 
Secondly, new analytical lenses to the relationship between the political 
and economic spheres are necessary in order to be able to accommodate 
the deviant cases of Southern Europe into VoC.
Production systems and protection models of 
Southern Europe
Recent analyses of the relationship between production regimes and 
welfare systems have concentrated on the degree of fit between them. 
Huber and Stephens (2001, p. 119) have argued that ‘within each country, 
certain –though not all– aspects of its welfare state and production 
regimes do «fit» each other’. They specifically refer to the need of 
pay and benefit levels to fit, and for labour market and social policies 
to be aligned in such a way that they do not create perverse incentives 
on economic actors. They go on to argue that protection regimes and 
production systems go together in ways that enhance the performance 
of firms and the efficiency of the national political economy, thereby 
contributing to comparative institutional advantage. 
VoC has conceptualised this relationship in terms of institutional 
complementarities, whereby the efficiency of one institution increases 
when it coincides and interacts with another (Aoki, 1994). One would 
expect the potential for misfit to be especially acute in those economies 
that do not conform closely to the LME or CME ideal types for, in theory, 
their sub-systems should be less well calibrated. This perception lies 
behind the reasoning of Hall and Gingerich (2004) for whom «hybrid» 
systems – such as those of southern Europe – will ceteris paribus under-
perform «purer» types. A number of authors have warned against the 
risks of this rather functional assumption (see for instance Crouch, 
2005), and have instead suggested that complementarities across policy 
domains with different rationales can also be detected. In a similar 
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vein, Boyer (1998) also points out to the potentially positive effects of 
hybridization when national architecture is heterogeneous and loose. If 
we accept institutional heterogeneity as a valid – and logically possible 
– source of institutional complementarities, then it is also possible for 
mixed economies to find their own forms of coordination and fit in line 
with the needs of their respective production systems (Rhodes, 2005). 
Other authors using a VoC lens have sought to confirm the hybridity 
= dysfunctionality equation. Amable (2003) argues that MMEs lack 
the pre-conditions for the existence of beneficial complementarities 
and positive spillovers found in the pure ideal-typical cases. Hence, 
the southern European model is characterised by strong employment 
protection, low levels of social protection that deter investment in specific 
skills, hence preventing the development of high value-added activities. 
Limits to competition created by product market regulation and state 
intervention allow for the maintenance of stable bank-industry relations 
that explain, in turn, the underdevelopment of financial markets. Together, 
these features lead to a pattern of industrial specialization based on small 
firms competing mainly on price and make it difficult to move on to a 
higher-wage/higher-skills development path.
Another central question when we deal with the relationship between 
production and protection systems is change. VoC finds it difficult to 
explain institutional change that is not path-dependent, incremental, 
exogenously-induced and employer-driven1. This is because institutional 
change in VoC is supposed to be driven by (i) firm-individual preferences 
determined by their types and levels of asset-specific investments and 
(ii) the capacities of actors in the system to establish durable forms of 
coordination in order to preserve complementarities. According to an 
asset-specific logic, actors are likely to become more committed to the 
continuation of an activity where those assets are present (O’Neil and 
Pierson, 2002, p  13). Applied to the realm of socio-economic institutions, 
actors that have invested in a certain institutional arrangement are more 
likely «to protect their investment by opposing change» (Gourevitch, 
2000) or to pursue incremental changes that maintain a high return on 
these investments2. Nonetheless, the capacity to defend these specific 
investments is determined to a large extent by the organisational 
characteristics of domestic interest groups, and more specifically trade 
unions and employer organizations (Menz, 2003). Hence, in CMEs well-
organised employer associations and well-articulated union organizations 
have created institutional arrangements that deliver a series of collective 
goods and help to protect specific asset investments (Crouch and Streeck, 
1997).
1. VoC puts a strong emphasis on institutional equilibriums and their resilience. To the 
extent that it enters into the explanation of institutional development, it remains unclear 
which logic dominates in each of the two ideal-types equilibriums, LMEs and CMEs.
2. Similarly, as pointed out by Lake (1999), institutions to a large extent determine the 
type and degree of investment in specific assets. This means that causality runs in both 
directions.
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A case in point is the role of industry collective bargaining frameworks 
in providing training and skills in the German industrial relations system 
(Thelen, 2001). As a consequence, reform coalitions in CMEs are more 
likely to be cross-class as both employers and employees share a common 
interest in protecting their comparative institutional advantage and 
associated complementarities. They will accordingly oppose attempts 
at neo-liberal de-regulation entailing the erosion of the industry-
level industrial relations institutions. By contrast, in LMEs employer 
organizations lack strong and well-organized associations and trade unions 
are either weak or fragmented, hence making it difficult to deliver the 
collective goods or autonomous forms of coordination required to support 
investment in specific assets. In the case of LMEs, complementarities 
seem to come from the less visible disciplining effect of market-driven 
regulation across policy arenas. Competitive forces are accommodated 
through an institutional setting where coalitions favourable to higher 
levels of institutional regulation struggle to find support. Given the 
weakness of trade unions at company level, reform is likely to be driven 
by a market-making logic. Instead of intervening to protect the specific 
investments and collective goods produced autonomously by employers 
and employees (as in CMEs), the state will be much more permeable to 
exogenous pressures and producer lobbies pushing for liberalization and 
de-regulation.
In the context of the above discussion, MMEs would lie somewhere 
in between. While unions and employers have stronger organizational 
structures than in LMEs, they are more fragmented and less well articulated 
than in CMEs. Moreover, even though they are unable to deliver the 
same collective goods or create autonomous frameworks of coordination 
in collective bargaining, they do have sufficient political power to veto 
change. This coordination failure within a veto-heavy system has triggered 
a higher degree of state intervention seeking to provide an alternative form 
of coordination (Schmidt, 2002). Processes of adjustment are therefore 
strongly dependent on the state’s gate-keeping role and the capacities 
of interest organizations to veto initiatives for change. Schmidt (2002) 
points to a third type of capitalism - state capitalism– in addition to the 
LME and CME ideal types. An important question in the context of the 
VoC literature is whether the state is capable of generating the kind of 
complementarities that exist in LMEs and CMEs. Crouch (2005) has 
strongly suggested that the state can act as a compensatory mechanism 
for introducing, extending and consolidating complementarities between 
institutions in countries that are considered «hybrid cases». But 
this is also true of CMEs, for as argued by Mares (2003, p. 237), state 
social policies act as a guarantor of employers’ investments in workers’ 
skills. This means that, depending on the form and the degree of state 
intervention, the benefits from protection systems for employers can 
outweigh the costs they incur from state policies, corporate taxes and 
employers’ contributions.
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Thus, in MMEs, where the role of the state is pervasive in both the 
production and protection systems, the absence of complementarities 
is related more to the degree and form taken by state intervention than 
to its presence per se. This has important implications for the analysis 
of complementarities and change in MMEs, where the recalibration of 
relations between production and protection systems has come along a 
re-configuration of the state’s role. Changes in the regulatory environment 
have been characterised by attempts to colonize arenas of state regulation 
with markets and/or autonomous regulation.
The implications of the above paragraphs for the analysis of the 
character and type of complementarities in MMEs are clear. First of all, 
the importance of the state arena has triggered the politicization and 
organizational centralization of social partners, hence hindering the 
development of strong forms of associative regulation and coordination 
at micro and meso levels. Social partners have invested in political power 
through strong alliances with political parties and clientelistic relations. 
As a consequence, industrial relations have traditionally been an arena 
for dealing with conflicts rather than providing protection, produce 
collective goods or achieve a better fit between production and protection 
systems. Moreover, adjustment processes depend to a large extent on the 
state; its willingness to intervene and the direction of this intervention. 
Finally, clientelism together with an active role of the state compensating 
coordination failures has led in many occasions to exchange subsidies for 
cooperation, hence leading to an excessive fragmentation in programs 
(Aparicio, 2002).
Institutional stability in these countries can very easily degenerate 
into sclerosis, hence perpetuating institutional conflicts and a permanent 
lack of complementarities between production and protection systems. 
Additionally, state regulation contributes to long-term inefficiencies as it 
perpetuates collective action problems. The lack of adequate mechanisms 
for the autonomous provision of collective goods together with state 
inability to cope with pressures of organized groups will make even more 
difficult to achieve mechanisms of autonomous coordination between 
organized actors. In the realm of the protection system, the difficulties to 
undertake a structural reform of the system together with the families’ 
inability to face the new demands for protection tend to increase the 
recourse to market solutions (Da Roit and Sabatinelli, 2005).
In the context of the reform of social protection systems in some 
European countries, Trampusch (2007) has developed a similar argument. 
According to her, the consequences of welfare state retrenchment not only 
depend on the politics of bargaining reforms, but also on the capacity of 
social partners to develop autonomous mechanisms of coordination 
and welfare provision. A high degree of coordination will ceteris paribus 
facilitate new forms of solidarity and protection trough associational 
self-regulation of those groups affected by new social risks. This serves to 
highlight the importance of alternative coordination mechanisms in the 
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realm of industrial relations that compensate for the structural rigidity of 
Mediterranean welfare states based on the extended family. 
Bringing politics back in: a two-tiered framework 
for analysis
The interaction between micro (company – local production) and 
macro (political system) levels in VoC is important to the extent that 
the latter determines (i) the propensity of economic actors to invest in 
specific assets as well as (ii) the possibilities of actors and coalitions to 
intervene in the policy-making process. Asset specificity is positively 
correlated with the capacity of political systems to make credible the 
maintenance of certain lines of policy and to diminish the probabilities of 
radical departures from them. This is because sharp swings in policy make 
specific-asset investments risky, while stable policies protect them (Hall 
and Soskice, 2001).
Institutional complementarities and asset specificity in the VoC 
approach supposedly spur the mobilisation of corporate actors and 
reform coalitions that contribute to perpetuating the core features of the 
system. Nonetheless, reform paths and the possibilities for change are also 
determined by certain features of the political system. Political systems 
with many veto points diminish the risk of radical policy change, a risk 
that is much higher under majoritarian systems that magnify the impact 
of small shifts in votes, thus allowing large swings in policy to occur 
(Hall and Gingerich, 2004). Political frameworks define the authority 
of government within an institutional system and hence its leeway for 
reform. They also determine which  actors can influence policy and to 
what extent. LMEs or shareholder systems are typically characterised 
by majoritarian systems where power is a concentrated in the hands of 
the executive and social actors are by and large excluded from policy-
making. CMEs typically have consensus-based systems where both 
the parliament and the executive share power. Moreover, strong and 
articulated social partners enjoy de facto (and some times de jure) veto 
influence in many policy arenas (Iversen and Soskice, 2007; Iversen, 
2005). Dedicated assets between interest groups and parties (the union 
as a transmission belt of a political party) are more likely in proportional 
and/or consociational systems, as electoral losses are less likely to erase the 
value of the investment. Westminster systems, where winners monopolize 
payoffs, limit incentives to create assets dedicated solely to one political 
party (O’Neil and Pierson, 2002, p. 20).
It follows from the above paragraphs that a two-level approach 
provides useful insights into the dynamics of institutional change 
in different models of capitalism and the factors underlying fit 
(complementary relations) and/or misfit between protection and 
production systems (see Amable, 2003, p 34-35, and Aoki, 2001 for 
similar ideas). This framework expands the (single-level) perspective 
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predominant in most of the VoC literature. The two-level perspective’s 
heuristic utility rests on the separation of two spheres of action, the 
micro and the macro, whose interaction determines change. Even though 
some authors in the VoC tradition have also pointed to the possibility of 
different logics of behaviour in upper (macro-political) and lower tiers 
(Hall and Gingerich 2004), this insight has not been developed to date for 
the analysis of policy innovation and institutional change.
figure 1: a Two-level analytical framework
Fragmentation of Actors
Forms of Coordination
State
Market
Autonomous
Coordination
-Types of Complementarities
-Asset-specific investments
Reform Coalitions
Political System:
-Veto Points
-Penetration by domestic coalitions
-Permeability to exogenous pressures
Exogenous Pressures
EMU
Socio-Economic 
Changes
Policy Change
Institutional Innovation
Macro
Micro
The framework we propose is illustrated in figure 1. This framework 
allows us to examine the mechanisms whereby lower-level demands are 
negotiated at the macro political level. At this level, the relevant dimensions 
to examine are the permeability of the state to domestic vetoes (Gualmini, 
1996) and the impact of exogenous pressures (Olsen, 2002). While state 
intervention and the fragmentation of corporate actors serve to explain 
some of the differences between countries in terms of coordination and 
interaction, the features of the political system become critical when it 
comes to explaining the dynamics of systems, i.e., policy and institutional 
change. ‘Domestic permeability’ will depend on the involvement of 
interest associations in socio-economic governance and the character 
of political institutions and reform coalitions. ‘Exogenous penetration’ 
will depend on the goodness of fit between domestic conditions and the 
exogenous requirements.
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The Spanish and italian mixed market 
Economies
In the Italian and Spanish MMEs, the fragmentation of industrial 
relations institutions and welfare programmes is related to the structural 
constraints placed by the production systems on capacities for collective 
interest organization. Nonetheless, because these countries share with 
the European continental CMEs a social insurance-based welfare system, 
protection and production are a priori much more closely coupled than 
in LMEs. This occurs first through the wage-labour nexus that links 
protection and production via the industrial relations system (Ebbinghaus 
and Manow, 2001, p. 13; Ferrera et al., 2003) – which, in turn, is linked 
to corporate governance practices (Gospel and Pendleton, 2005); and 
second, through the character of social protection delivered via labour 
market policies (Martin and Swank, 2004). Fragmentation also impedes 
the development of autonomous non-market and non-state mechanisms 
of coordination across sectors and levels (Martin and Swank, 2004, 
p. 593), and augments centrifugal pressures from particularistic demands. 
Fragmentation therefore profoundly shapes the nature of reform 
coalitions and their mobilisation as it is obstaculises the formation of 
strong and stable cross-class coalitions.
On the other hand, the possibilities of single actors or coalitions 
to intervene in the policy-making process depend on the structural 
characteristics of the political system. There is disagreement in the 
literature as to the consociational or consensual character of Italian 
democracy (Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000; Zucchini, 1997), but at least 
during the so-called (pre-1992) «First Republic», political parties 
and the executive regulated conflict through compromises and mutual 
concessions. Changes in the 1990s have given a more majoritarian 
flavour to the system. Spain, however, is unambiguously associated 
with a competitive type of democracy where party competition exerts 
a disciplining role in the system. Developments in the two countries in 
the 1990s took different directions. While the role of parliament was 
strengthened in Spain in 1993-2000 (Pérez Díaz, 1999), developments in 
the early 1990s’ Italy initiated a transition from consensual to competitive 
democracy, thus strengthening the executive’s role. The Italian political 
system contains many veto points and constraints on the political 
behaviour of the government, which exacerbated by «partitocrazia» (La 
Palombara, 1987) has been a strong impediment for institutional change 
(Molina and Rhodes, 2007a). Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) provide a 
similar view of these countries: Spain ranks very high in terms of political 
cohesion (close to pure majoritarianism) whilst Italy ranks very low (close 
to consensual). The political framework structures actors’ interactions by 
determining the number of veto players within constitutional structures 
(Tsebelis, 2002) as well as partisan influences, electoral pressures and 
practices of co-determination (Frege and Kelly, 2003, pp. 16-17) and, 
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by extension, also shapes the contents of public policies and domestic 
responses to exogenous challenges (Schmidt, 2002).
Based on the above insights, we can conclude that even though 
MMEs will exhibit some distinctive traits in their micro logics of change 
and adjustment compared to CMEs and LMEs, the outcomes of change 
might also differ due to the differences in the political system. In the case 
of LMEs, change will occur more rapidly due to a smaller number of veto 
points. On the contrary, institutional change would proceed more slowly 
in CMEs where it is necessary to include a large number of actors in the 
decision-making process in order to guarantee institutional coherence 
across sub-systems. There is a bottom-up logic driving change in CMEs 
whereby, given the high levels of cooperation and coordination between 
actors as well as their capacity to produce collective goods at micro-level, 
political actors will have incentives to include them in the policy process.
By contrast, a weaker relationship between production and protection 
spheres, together with fragmented corporate actors, leaves MMEs more 
exposed to the disrupting effects of external shocks and less equipped to 
follow a negotiated adjustment path. The high levels of conflict that have for 
many years afflicted industrial relations in Italy and Spain are a reflection 
of their low capacity to build autonomous forms of coordination at micro 
levels, which impede bottom-up dynamics of cross-class negotiation and 
incorporation. Accordingly, MMEs are characterized by a top-down logic 
of institutional governance; governments in these countries are forced to 
rely on punctual political exchange at national level with social partners in 
order to find a negotiated solution to the conflicts generated at micro level 
(Molina, 2005). The fragility of coordination mechanisms both at macro 
and micro levels impedes the formation of stable cross-lass coalitions, 
hence making it difficult the institutionalization of neo-corporatist 
systems and consensus-based forms of adaptation. Sporadic concertation 
has proved to be an effective «crisis governance» mechanism, enhancing 
governability and compensating partially for the lack of stable 
mechanisms of autonomous coordination. 
Spain: state retrenchment, weakly organized 
capitalism and market liberalization
Under the Franco dictatorship, the Spanish production system was 
characterised by high levels of protection and pervasive state intervention. 
After the industrial crisis of the early 1980s, the industrial structure 
became more polarised and entered a period of profound transformation. 
The changes experiencing the production system, together with the 
organizational fragmentation of employers and trade unions contributed 
to high levels of social and industrial conflict (Rigby and Marco, 2001). 
Weakly organized employers’ organizations followed a confrontational 
approach to union militancy. The CEOE employers’ federation lacked 
the negotiating authority that might have been expected to follow from 
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its monopoly of employers interest representation. This is explained by 
the difficulties CEOE experienced in gaining access to policy-making 
under the Socialist government, its own incoherent organizational 
architecture and the increasingly important role of MNCs investing in 
Spain that developed their own lobbying channels (Heywood, 1995, pp. 
255-6). Even though, the centralization of industrial relations in the early 
1980s contributed to democratic consolidation and macroeconomic 
adjustment, it frustrated any possibility of strengthening autonomous 
bottom-up coordination by social and economic actors as an alternative 
to either state intervention or the extension of market forms of regulation. 
Although sectoral industrial relations frameworks soon developed at 
national and provincial level, they took the form of narrow collective 
bargaining mechanisms subordinated to the dictates of peak-level union 
officials, rather than company-based regulatory frameworks facilitating 
the provision of collective goods for companies and workers such as 
vocational training. 
The state’s role consisted in providing passive forms of assistance 
to both workers and firms (state aids to industry, early retirement, the 
extension of unemployment benefits) and the externalization of the costs 
of adjustment on to workers (wage moderation, labour market flexibility) 
and to a lesser extent companies. Due to the absence of micro and meso-
level mechanisms of regulation and strategic coordination, the policy of 
state retrenchment followed since the mid 1980s – but which accelerated 
during the 1990s – left a vacuum filled very often by liberalization and 
the extension of market principles. The strategy of economic recovery 
based on Foreign Direct Investment inflows followed by the Socialist 
government in the mid-1980s opened the door to a liberalizing agenda 
and left the state more vulnerable to the objectives of foreign capital.
The state assisted the extension and consolidation of a residual and 
fragmented welfare state3 where unemployment subsidies and early 
retirement schemes expanded significantly in the 1980s and worsened the 
government’s budgetary position. From the late 1980s on, we can talk of 
a liberalizing bias in the Spanish welfare system and a shift away from its 
original conservative-corporatist character, its high level of protection and 
channeling of massive resources into the «competitive rationalization» 
of industry, towards an emphasis on creating new employment through 
active labour market policies (Moreno and Sarassa, 1992, p. 15). 
Nonetheless, the extent to which there has been a real activation of the 
social protection system has been conditioned by the weak capacity 
of employers and unions to engage in joint coordination. Even though 
active labour market policies (ALMPs) have increased since the 1980s 
both in terms of funding and number of initiatives, the weakness of local 
structures of social partner representation – as demonstrated, for example, 
3. The Spanish welfare state can be understood as a via media with respect to other welfare 
systems as it incorporates elements of both the breadwinner-centred continental model 
and the citizenship-centred liberal model (Moreno, 1997).
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by the disappointing outcomes of attempts to draw up local employment 
agreements – have limited the extension of these policies (EIRO 1997). 
The most important problem is the lack of organisation among small 
businesses with paternalistic labour relations that dedicate little resources 
to technical innovation and vocational training. Muñoz (2002, p. 50) also 
invokes these reasons to explain the poor connection between the state-
financed vocational training system and the world of work. 
Activation policies have also been obstructed by flexibility in the 
entry to the labour market and the rapid extension of atypical forms 
of employment. This has coincided with a shift from state-guaranteed 
employment protection towards looser regulation and the extension of 
more individualized, fragmented and diverse employment conditions 
(Encarnacion, 1999, p. 33). Under the Socialist government, employment 
policy initiatives – such as a the Rural Employment Plan – focused on 
maintaining income levels rather than on the development of training 
schemes and skills enhancing plans. Thus subsidised employment 
has been an important active measure in Spain (Fravega, 2004). As a 
consequence, there has been a reduction in overall protection due to a 
progressive rupture of standard employment transitions triggered by 
increasing temporary employment, self-employment and the reduction 
of firing costs (Lopez and Verd, 2004). 
The 1984 labour market reform established a two-tiered model of 
labour market segmentation leading to a sharp increase in fixed-term 
contracts (Adam and Canziani, 1997; Polavieja and Richards, 2001). 
Most of the jobs created in the late 1980s’ expansion were temporary and 
this helped to reduce unemployment. However, the perverse effects of 
this policy became clear right afterwards, when the recession of the early 
1990s was accompanied by massive lay-offs of temporary workers, as well 
as a substitution of indefinite by atypical contracts; the Spanish economy 
relied upon these contracts as a mechanism of adjustment (Rhodes, 1997b; 
Saint-Paul, 2000). Other negative effects of the extension of atypical forms 
of employment and the frequent recourse to fixed-term contracts was the 
little incentives workers and companies alike had to invest in specific skills 
and the concomitant impact on productivity levels. 
Reliance upon external or quantitative mechanisms of labour market 
flexibility has been more widespread in the case of SMEs as large firms 
could more easily resort to internal forms of flexibility. Thus the reliance 
on temporary employment further accentuated the low-wage, price-
based, medium-low technology production system in Spain. SMEs found 
it cheaper to adopt labour-intensive strategies at a time of relatively high 
interest rates, rather than to invest in new equipment and technology. 
A cost-based competitive strategy with a low-skilled labour force led 
employers to pay less attention to on-the-job training, thereby reducing 
the sunk costs incurred by firms on hiring and minimising the incentives 
to keep employees in the firm in the case of a negative shock. The fact 
that workers in Spain have been burdened with the lion’s share of costs 
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derived from economic and institutional adjustment poses the question 
of reform coalitions at play. With few exceptions, the relations between 
labour unions and employer organisations as class-based organizations 
have been characterized since the transition to democracy by conflict. The 
sporadic negotiation of social pacts or bipartite agreements hasn’t meant 
the existence of a cross-class coalition, though the degree of collaboration 
and cooperation between unions and employers has improved significantly 
in the last fifteen years. Employers have been able to build two parallel 
coalitions in order to pursue their agenda.
First, the existence of a similar specialization pattern in large and 
small companies has allowed Spanish employers to build a class coalition 
before the trade union movement. As a consequence of membership 
losses as well as divisions between confederations, trade unions adopted a 
defensive position of insiders’ interests which in the medium and long run 
proved to be self-defeating. This situation led to high levels of industrial 
conflict and an increasing weakness of trade unions with respect to 
employer organizations which had a clear reflection in the character of 
reforms. Already in the 1990s, trade unions adopted a different approach 
based on social dialogue and cooperation with employer organizations as 
a result of which several pacts were signed. The objective of this change in 
trade unions’ attitude was to improve the government of labour relations 
as well as to introduce negotiated changes in the employment protection 
system.
In addition to this, employers were also able to create in the 1980s a 
coalition between large domestic companies and multinationals investing 
in Spain. The objective of this coalition was to accelerate the process of 
economic liberalization of product, labour and capital markets as well 
as to move towards privatization of state holdings (Arocena, 2004). 
The political weakness of a trade union due to the erosion of the direct 
channel with political parties and the ensuing loss of political leverage, 
contributed to the above capital coalition to achieve the objectives. On 
the other hand, the privileged relations between the economics ministry 
and the banking system in the early years of democracy explains a more 
liberal economic policy compared to unions’ demands. 
italy: state resilience and the struggle for reform
In spite of their structural similarities as members of a Mediterranean 
variety of capitalism, the Italian economy differed in some important 
respects from the Spanish system by the end of the 1980s: the existence 
of a more developed and consolidated industrial structure (at least in 
the centre and northern regions), better organized corporate actors 
with a comparatively higher level of penetration at the local / company 
level, stronger national-sector collective bargaining frameworks, a more 
developed social protection system, and the greater resilience and 
pervasiveness of state regulatory intervention in several arenas of the 
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production and protection systems that according to Della Sala (2004) 
determined a «dysfunctional state capitalism». 
These and other differences that we will comment in the next 
paragraphs have determined a distinctive pattern and speed of adjust-
ment in the Italian production regime and protection systems compared 
to Spain. Following a decade of policy and institutional hysteresis, the 
1990s have been characterized by a series of negotiated reforms which 
have nonetheless occurred in a sporadic and chaotic way (Lodovoci, 
1999). What distinguishes the Italian experience compared to Spain 
is the deeper involvement of trade unions in the negotiation of change 
and their capacity to veto certain policy decisions thanks to a instable 
political system which has required social partners to assume policy-
making roles. This in spite of the membership loses since the early 1980s 
and inter-confederal divisions. The convulsions of the system following 
the Tangentopoli affair leading to the dissolution of the existing political 
parties and the establishment of technocratic governments in the early 
1990s, forced parties and governments to seek union support in order 
to pass reforms in the areas of labour market and social protection. As 
a consequence of this, several social pacts were signed which set the 
foundations for macroeconomic adjustment and Italy joining the Euro.
Italian unions have taken advantage of their position in order to 
engage into a strong pulse to maintain the rights and privileges of 
their members (mostly employers with indefinite contracts as well as 
pensioners). Employment protection and the pension system play «de 
facto» the role of a security net in the Italian welfare system due to the 
weakness of counter-cyclical social benefits like unemployment subsi-
dies, employment services and active labour market policies. Moreover, 
the solidaristic wage policy promoted by trade unions in the collective 
bargaining system behaves like a redistributive mechanism by maintaining 
the wage income of workers in Southern regions (Ferrera, 1997; Rostagno 
and Utili, 1998). Government inability to shift financial resources from 
old-age pensions to other social protection programs in order to cover 
the risk and uncertainty underlying labour market transitions of other 
groups, most notably young and women, is to a large extent due the trade 
unions’ defence of their traditional membership. This position has had 
a series of negative consequences, like for instance increasing labour 
market segmentation and a welfare system focused on the fordist male-
breadwinner worker on one side, and pensioners on the other. Public 
sector employment in southern regions has acted as a substitute for social 
transfer in regions affected by high unemployment levels. It has been 
shown how around half of the wage paid to public or private employees 
in the Mezzogiorno corresponds to various kinds of subsidies (Alesina et 
al., 2001). All together, this explains why some issues which fall within 
the field of autonomous bargaining between unions and employers in 
the industrial relations system assume a wider political dimension in Italy, 
hence complicating the whole adjustment process.
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The characteristics of the Italian employment regulation system have 
exacerbated a dualism between the conditions and degree of protection 
of employees in small and large firms, hence explaining the existence 
of radically different policy preferences of workers. The 1970 Workers’ 
Statute established an intricate system of employment protection for 
companies above fifteen employees, hence leaving large protection gaps 
for employees in smaller firms. Similarly to what has been said in the case 
of Spain, the difficulties to establish long-lasting forms of autonomous 
coordination between actors in the industrial relations system has limited 
the incentives and capacities of individual actors to invest in specific assets 
necessary in order to sustain complementarities between company needs, 
workers’ demands and the protection system. 
The shift towards activation in labour market policies has been slow, 
with only some significant measures being introduced in the 1990s. There 
are two main impediments to the consolidation of ALMPs. The first is 
related to the weak coordination capacities of trade unions and employers, 
while the second has to do with the incentives for keeping passive forms 
of state assistance in operation. A case in point is the Cassa Integrazione 
Guadagni (CIG), through which the state maintains the wages of workers 
of companies engaged in restructuring. The CIG was created after an 
agreement between unions and employers in the northern regions and 
reflects the propensity in the Italian system for the state to internalize costs 
in the production system. From the 1980s on, large firms in crisis have 
asked for CIG help in company-specific restructuring (Franzini, 2001). 
The use of early retirement schemes and subsided employment schemes 
(especially for youths) is also widespread (Fravega, 2004). Contrary to 
Spain, where new forms of flexibility and policies of adjustment in the 
labour market have entailed a reduction in social protection for workers, 
in Italy these new instruments have guaranteed comparatively higher 
levels of social protection accompanied by a significant increase in labour 
costs4.
Reliance upon CIG in order to maintain wages during restructuring 
processes has remained significant in the 1990s (Franzini, 2000). Even 
though it is an onerous program from states’ finances point of view, 
trade unions have defended it as an instrument to minimize conflict 
in processes of change and restructuring of large companies. In this 
vein, a fragmented cross-class coalition of unions and large companies 
in declining sectors has developed in favour of a compensatory state. 
Divisions within the employer side reflecting the fragmented nature of 
the financial and production sector together with the lower presence 
of multinational companies hindered the formation of a broad capital 
4. According to Fravega (2004) so-called «Co.co.co.» – collaboratori coordinati e 
continuativi – contracts (with lower costs and dismissals protection) have created an 
intermediate space of protection between self-employment and standard work. Other 
forms of subsided employment (credito d’imposta, sgravio triennale) have effectively 
subsided firms since the cost reductions are a reward for creating new jobs.
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coalition as happened in Spain in the 1980s. This explains why small 
companies are more distanced from large companies’ preferences in Italy. 
As they have a restricted access to mechanisms like CIG , they have been 
more favourable to policies of labour market flexibility and de-regulation. 
However, and given their lower degree of influence over the policy-
making process, they have been forced to build their own responses to 
the adaptation needs posed by changing economic conditions. This 
would explain for instance the development of industrial districts where 
stakeholders of small companies have joined forces in order to provide 
a series of collective goods like training or protection that neither the 
industrial relations system nor the state could provide.
The introduction of labour market flexibility and de-regulation, has by 
far been more limited than in neighbouring countries. Ferner and Hyman 
(1998, p. 464) refer to this as a process of «articulated de-regulation». 
Moreover, it has been characterised by consensus and concertation 
(Regini, 2000). Until the mid-1980s, there was a cross-class consensus 
on the model of flexibility and its limits. Collective bargaining governed 
the extension of flexibility in hiring practices, working hours and wages. 
Unions allowed greater internal flexibility in exchange for a limit on the 
extension of external numerical flexibility (Regalia and Regini, 1995). 
From then on the positions of unions and employer associations have 
diverged and the introduction of flexibility has followed a case-by-
case approach preventing both employers and the government from 
implementing the more comprehensive reforms required to generate 
positive complementarities (Coe and Snower, 1997; Belot and van Ourst, 
2004). Self-employment has provided an alternative form of flexibility 
in response to the restrictive labour market regulations imposed by 
unions on hiring and firing costs (Bertola 1990), though firms also 
obtain some flexibility through sub-contracting (Ozaki, 1999, p. 10)5. 
But self-employment also increased exit from the regular sector (covered 
by collective bargaining) at both ends of the skill distribution: highly 
skilled workers left to seek higher returns to self-employment, while the 
less skilled were forced into the more precarious underground economy 
(Erickson and Ichino, 1995, p. 302).
Finally, a distinctive feature of the Italian experience has been its 
greater capacity to experiment with innovative forms of autonomous 
coordination. This reflects the stronger associative capacity of Italian 
interest associations at lower levels compared to Spain. But it is also a 
response of employers to some weaknesses of the industrial relations 
system, and in particular the uncertainty created by shop-floor militancy 
and high levels of industrial conflict. These two features have determined 
employers’ long-term decisions with respect to their workforce, negatively 
affecting the propensity of companies to invest in the training of strike-
prone workers (Genda et al., 2001). On the other hand, they have also 
5. Nonetheless, the 1990s have witnessed a significant increase in atypical forms of 
work such as temporary, fixed-term and part-time contracts.
Corps-PôleSud-n°28-Corps.indd   26 8/10/08   15:27:05
D
oc
um
en
t t
él
éc
ha
rg
é 
de
pu
is 
ww
w.
ca
irn
.in
fo
 - 
Un
ive
rs
ita
t A
ut
?n
om
a 
de
 B
ar
ce
lo
na
 - 
  -
 1
58
.1
09
.2
24
.9
5 
- 0
8/
04
/2
01
5 
13
h4
8.
 ©
 A
RP
oS
 Docum
ent téléchargé depuis www.cairn.info - Universitat Aut?nom
a de Barcelona -   - 158.109.224.95 - 08/04/2015 13h48. © ARPoS 
26
Pôle Sud n° 28
27
Pôle Sud n° 28 
The Reform of Social Protection Systems
favoured the appearance of new forms of coordination at the margins of 
the official collective bargaining system, such as the extension of firm-
level negotiations to create a more favourable bargaining environment 
and escape from the constraints imposed at higher levels – what Regini 
(1999) has called «micro-corporatism». A second mechanism is the 
development of industrial districts, that is, geographical areas with 
homogenous production structures, solid vocational training institutions, 
high mobility of technicians, large flexibility in the organization of 
production, a strong capacity for adaptation to demand, and very close 
relationships between users and upstream producers of specialised 
machinery.
As pointed out by Visintin (1999), even in the area of corporate 
governance and the relationship between banks and firms, the situation 
in industrial districts differs from the economy in general, as cooperative 
relationships between firms and banks are more frequent and stable. More 
recently, the extension of forms of local and regional concertation under 
the mechanisms of programmazione negoziata has provided the Italian 
local social system of production with another form – though one that is 
limited in scope – of autonomous coordination.
concluding Remarks
This paper has argued that change in protection systems of MMEs 
is subject to conflicting, and often contradictory trends due to the 
fragmented nature of class coalitions and a long tradition of class conflict. 
Part of the reason for this lies in the difficulties in relying upon and 
sustaining mechanisms of autonomous coordination, cooperation, and 
regulation at micro levels that could deliver collective goods and provide 
the foundations for macro forms of cooperation and negotiated regula-
tion. At the same time, the lack of strong micro-foundations is explained 
by the fragmentation of interests as well as the historically strong role of 
the state in the economy, which hindered the development of autono-
mous mechanisms of regulation in the labour market, and more gene-
rally, the protection regime.
These similarities justify their inclusion within a MME type, which 
possesses clearly delimitated adjustment mechanisms compared to the 
LMEs or CMEs. The distinctiveness of Mediterranean countries had 
already been highlighted by analysis of labour markets, welfare states, 
etc. This article has moved one step further by trying to understand the 
dynamics underlying change and the existence of common trends in the 
two countries analysed. Regarding change, the article has proposed a two-
level analytical framework where strategic interactions at company level 
are explained and interpreted within the broader macro framework of the 
political system. The relationship between the two tiers is one of mutual 
inter-dependence and causation. The forms of interaction at company 
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level have determined the incentives individual actors face and by 
extension, the type of coalitions that will emerge in the face of shocks 
to the system. The capacity of these coalitions to advance their demands 
for change and/or stability will depend on the spaces opened up by the 
political framework.
By contrast to the argument underlying varieties of capitalism, 
according to which institutional change is dictated by the requirements 
of the production system, the analysis of the Italian and Spanish cases 
serves to highlight the importance of politics and power relations to 
understand diverging change in countries that lie outside the boundaries 
of CMEs or LMEs. The fragmentation of collective actors has in both 
cases impeded the formation of stable cross-class alliances and by the 
same token, of complementarities at micro and meso levels. At the same 
time, state intervention has not only contributed to the perpetuation of 
coordination problems, but has also led to the politicization of collective 
interests, hence explaining the key role of politics in determining the 
form and degree of adjustment.
The analysis of changes in protection systems of Italy and Spain 
following the analytical framework proposed above confirms the 
importance of adopting a micro-macro perspective to understand 
change. Only by incorporating insights from the micro Varieties of 
Capitalism approach as well as from the politics of welfare reform 
literature we can explain the different directions followed by protection 
systems. Thus, whilst in both countries there has been a movement 
towards retrenchment, privatisation and the liberalization of goods and 
services markets (including factor markets such as labour), this process 
has been faster and gone farther in Spain, particularly with regard to 
the liberalization of social protection, labour markets and financial 
markets (Martinez Lucio and McKenzie, 2004). The differences in the 
capacity of economic actors to fill the vacuum left by these changes, has 
determined the nature of the shifts in the regulatory triangle between 
state, associations and market, with a stronger bias towards market 
regulation in Spain6.
These changes are important for understanding the nature of 
complementarities between the production and protection systems in 
these two countries and the extent to which there has been a regime 
shift over the last two decades. In Spain, where the production system 
is characterized by a specialization in labour intensive, low-skill, low-
technology intensive strategies, waves of liberalization and state 
retrenchment have reinforced sub-system complementarities in the 
direction of an LME-type equilibrium. The comparative institutional 
advantage of Spain would seem to rely on the flexibility of easy «hire and 
6. In this respect, the experience of Spain resembles in many ways that of     France,as 
depicted by Hancké and Goyer (2005), who argue that the «non-involvement» of French 
labour allowed firms to push through changes over the last twenty years that brought them 
closer to their Anglo-Saxon counterparts.
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fire», the expansion of low-paid service sector work and the increasing 
role of ‘impatient’ capital. Nonetheless, Spain is still a long way from 
becoming a pure LME as its more developed welfare system, a relatively 
well-organized collective bargaining system and a protective labour 
market regulation provide many instances of non-market regulation. 
On the other hand, recent developments in the 1990s have indicated 
a search for enhanced coordination in the collective bargaining and 
vocational training systems that also distance Spain from the LME ideal 
type. The picture is different in Italy where only recently have there been 
real attempts to liberalize markets and undertake a real retrenchment of 
the state business sector. As has been shown, state resilience has meant 
the maintenance of a wide range of instruments – both regulatory and 
financial – of non-market, state coordination. As a matter of fact, the 
institutional incongruence and misfits found in the Italian production-
protection nexus have not been substantially modified over the last 
twenty years.
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